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ABSTRACT
According to agency theory there were separation of function between principal and
agent. This separation created different interest between principal and agent. This condi-
tion occurs because of the asymmetric information that agent more knew company infor-
mation than principal. Therefore, it was interesting to study the actions of management.
This research aimed to analyze the influence of leverage and free cash flow to earning
management and the ability to analyze the influence corporate governance consisting of
managerial ownership, institusional ownership, independent commissioner, and audit
comittee in influencing earnings management on the listed manufacturing companies in
Indonesia Stock Exchange during years 2010-2014. The results showed that leverage
significantly influence to earnings management and free cash flow significantly influ-
ence to earnings management moderating variables that influence the relationship of
leverage to earnings management is managerial ownership, independent commissioner,
audit comitte, and moderating variables that influence the relationship of free cash flow
to earning management was managerial ownership and institusional ownership.
ABSTRAK
Menurut teori keagenan terdapat pemisahan fungsi antara principal dengan agen. Pemisahan
fungsi ini menciptakan kepentingan yang berbeda antara principal dengan agen. Hal ini terjadi
karena adanya informasi asimetris, dimana agen lebih mengetahui informasi perusahaan dibanding
dengan prinsipal. Oleh karena itu menarik untuk mempelajari tindakan manajemen. Penelitian
ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh leverage dan free cash flow terhadap manajemen laba
dan kemampuan corporate governance yang terdiri dari kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan
institusional, komisaris independen, dan komite audit dalam mempengaruhi manajemen laba
pada perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama tahun 2010-2014.
Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa leverage dan free cash flow berpengaruh secara signifikan
terhadap manajemen laba. Kepemilikan manajerial, komisaris independen, dan komite audit adalah
variabel yang memoderasi hubungan leverage dengan manajemen laba. Kepemilikan manajerial
dan kepemilikan institusional adalah variabel yang memoderasi hubungan free cash flow dengan
manajemen laba.
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Earnings management is the action taken by the
management company to affect reported earnings,
which could provide information about the eco-
nomic benefits (economic advantage) who was not
experienced by the company, and in the long term
such actions could be detrimental to the company
(Naftalia, 2013). This is also possible because man-
agement has the opportunity, power, and knowl-
edge to adjust how much profit is desired.
Many related groups have an interest in the
financial statements and each of them has differ-
ent interests. The interest group are manager,
owner, investor, creditor, or other groups. Each
put different expectations on the financial state-
ments. So there is a conflict of interest caused by
information asymmetry between the principal and
the agent. Conflicts of interest between the man-
ager as agent and owner as principal are discussed
in agency theory.
Agency theory illustrates that earnings man-
agement occurs as a result of the different eco-
nomic interests between the management as an
agent and as principal owner (Gunawan, Darmawan,
& Purnamawati, 2015). Information that manag-
ers have not always similar to that held by the
shareholders, where managers know the actual
condition of the company, the differences infor-
mation about this company called information
asymmetry, where the company manager uses his
knowledge for the benefit of himself.
Based on agency theory, management actions
can be overcome or minimized through corporate
governance mechanisms. The mechanism of cor-
porate governance is proposed concept for im-
proving corporate performance through supervi-
sion or monitoring management performance and
ensure the accountability of management to the
stakeholders by looking at the regulatory frame-
work (Naftalia, 2013). There are 4 of corporate
governance mechanism that can control the actions
of earnings management, the managerial owner-
ship, institutional ownership, independent board,
and audit committee.
Managerial ownership, which has a share
ownership by the management of the company
where the existence of managerial ownership,
management not only functioned as a manager of
the company but also as a shareholder. Then there
is the institutional ownership, according to Ridwan
& Gunardi (2013) institutional investor ownership
can use the periodic information in predicting fu-
ture earnings compared to non-institutional inves-
tors. Then an independent board of commission-
ers, an independent board of commissioners is a
member of the board of commissioners who is not
affiliated with the management of the company
and any other member of the board of commis-
sioners, and the controlling shareholder. And free
from the business relationship or other relation-
ship which could affect its ability to act indepen-
dently (Fanani, 2014). Last is the audit committee,
the audit committee’s task is related to the quality
of the financial reports, because of the audit com-
mittee is expected to assist the commissioners in
performing the reports is controling the financial
reporting process by management (Kristiani,
Sulindawati, & Herawati, 2014).
Leverage is indicated to be one of the causes
of earnings management. According to Pambudi
& Sumantri (2014) an agreement between the
company’s debt as the debtor by creditors. In this
debt agreements, there are the interests of the
company to be assessed positively by the lenders
in terms of ability to pay its debts. There is a pos-
sibility that the contract agreements trigger debt
try to increase profits with the aim of showing the
positive performance on creditors so as to obtain
a booster of funds. Leverage can show how big
the company’s assets are financed by debt. Lever-
age measured by the ratio of total debt to total
assets.
Companies with free cash flow is high will
have a greater opportunity to earnings manage-
ment, because the company indicated face greater
agency problems (Agustia, 2013). Free cash flow
is the free cash flow after investing company which
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is expected to generate profits in the future, and
has paid the debt, and has distributed dividends,
but still have the rest of the cash. Free cash flow
provides an overview of the company’s ability in
the future. In the other side of the free cash flow
turned out to cause trouble the agency, which led
to the management considered to be more selfish
in using surplus cash. Thus, companies with high
free cash flow will have a greater opportunity to
earnings management, because the company indi-
cated greater agency problems. The purpose of this
study is to analyze the effect of leverage, free cash
flow to earnings management as well as analyze
the influence of corporate governance on lever-
age and free cash flow relationship with earnings
management.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The Effect of Leverage on Earnings
Management
Zakaria, Sanusi, & Mohamed (2015) explains
that the company has a high leverage may face the
risk of bankruptcy if they are unable to make pay-
ments on their external debt financing. Therefore,
usually a company that tends to have a high lever-
age will increase the level of such opportunistic
earnings management to maintain its performance
in the supervise of shareholders and the public.
The level of corporate debt (leverage) could af-
fect earnings management action. High leverage
due to mismanagement in managing corporate fi-
nance or strategy implementation is lacking. Be-
cause of the lack of supervision led to high lever-
age, also will increase the acts oppurtunistic such
as earnings management to maintain its perfor-
mance in the eyes of shareholders and public
(Naftalia, 2013). Leverage used in this study is the
ratio between debt and assets. The greater the debt
of a company compared to its assets, the greater
the risk faced by the company to pay its obliga-
tions will be. The greater the leverage ratio shows
the greater the company’s dependence on exter-
nal parties (creditors) and the greater the burden
of debt costs (interest costs) that have to be paid
by the company.
This is according to research conducted by
Zamri, Rahman, & Isa (2013) and conducted by
Lee (2013) who found results that leverage posi-
tive effect on earning management action. Based
on the description, first hypotheses of this research
is:
H1: leverage positive effect on earnings manage-
ment
The Effect of Free Cash Flow on Earnings
Management
Free cash flow can be interpreted as the
existance of excess funds, which should be distrib-
uted to the shareholders but the decision was in-
fluenced by management policy (Fanani, 2014).
Companies with free cash flow is high will have a
greater opportunity to earnings management, be-
cause the company indicated face greater agency
problems where the shareholder (principal) autho-
rizes the management (agent). Agents are more
aware of information about the state of the com-
pany including the existence of free cash flow. The
transfer of responsibilities and power of sharehold-
ers to the manager, the agency raises issues re-
lated to the difference of interests between the
shareholders or principal to his agent. The share-
holders want the free cash flow distributed as divi-
dends, while the manager wants free cash flow
used for investments that will be profitable for
the manager. Free cash flow contained in the com-
pany would affect the company’s performance.
Free cash flow can be interpreted as the existance
of excess funds, which should be distributed to
the shareholders but the decision was influenced
by management policy (Arieska & Gunawan, 2011).
The manager is always willing to improve
power through control over resources are greater,
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it will continue to encourage managers to invest
in an effort to expand the company and increase
their incentives. Therefore, with the free cash flow
will encourage managers to invest. As a result,
companies with high free cash flow coupled with
low growth opportunities will continue to tend to
invest in projects with negative NPV, which may
benefit managers, either in money or in return,
but will degrade the company’s performance. Fur-
thermore, in a try to cover up the company’s per-
formance, the manager will act earnings manage-
ment to increase profits (Fanani, 2014). So, it can
be concluded that the higher the value of the sur-
plus free cash flow of a company, the higher the
possibility of earning management management.
This is consistent with the results of research that
has been done by Kono (2013) who found results
that free cash flow positive effect on earnings
management action. Based on the description, sec-
ond hypotheses of this research is:
H2: free cash flow positive effect on earnings
management
The Effect of Managerial Ownership on the
Relationship between Leverage and
Management
Managerial ownership is share owned by
management in person or share owned by subsid-
iaries of the concerned companies and affiliates.
Indicators to measure the managerial ownership
is the percentage ratio of the number of shares
owned by the management of the entire outstand-
ing share capital of the company (Agustia, 2013).
With the managerial ownership that can be used
to minimize earnings management due to the use
of leverage by a management company for their
managerial ownership can be aligning interests
between shareholders and managers, where man-
agers also act as shareholders. Based on the de-
scription, third hypotheses of this research is:
H3: managerial ownership affects the relation-
ship between leverage and earnings man-
agement
The Effect of Managerial Ownership on the
Relationship between Free Cash Flow and
Earnings Management
Managerial ownership is the ownership of a
company’s shares by the management. With mana-
gerial ownership, management not only functions
as a company manager but also as a shareholder.
Management ownership of the shares of compa-
nies seen to align the potential difference between
the interests of shareholders with management
(Naftalia, 2013). So, the agency problems arising
from their free cash flow of a company is assumed
to be lost when a manager acts as well as an owner.
From the standpoint of accounting theory, earn-
ings management is largely determined by the
motivation of corporate managers. Different mo-
tivation will produce a different amount of earn-
ings management, such as the manager who also
serves as a shareholder and a manager who is not
a shareholder. Thus, fourth hypotheses can be de-
veloped as follows:
H4: managerial ownership affects the relation-
ship between free cash flow and earnings
management
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on the
Relationship between Leverage and Earnings
Management
The institutional ownership is the ownership
of the company’s shares by an outsider in the form
of an institution, which is expected to reduce the
company’s deviant management action. With the
high institutional ownership, institutional inves-
tors will get a chance the company’s control.
Naftalia (2013) shortly explain that the high insti-
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tutional ownership limit managers to manage profit
(earnings management). So, with the institutional
ownership can help monitor outcomes measure
enterprise managers in conducting related oppor-
tunistic action in leverage the company so as to
minimize earnings management action. Thus, fifth
hypotheses can be developed as follows:
H5: institutional ownership affects the leverage
relationships and earnings management
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on the
Relationship between Free Cash Flow and
Earnings Management
Free Cash Flow is the actual cash flows are
distributed to investors after the company do all
the investment and working capital required to
maintain existance of operations (Agustia, 2013).
Institutional ownership is the ownership of com-
pany shares by large investors such as insurance
companies, banks, pension funds, and investment
banking who buy shares in large quantities
(Agustia, 2013). Institutional ownership is mea-
sured by the number of shares held by institutional
investors compared to the total shares of the com-
pany. So that with the institutional parties who
invest in the company can come to control the
company’s manager in the use of free cash flow.
Thus, sixth hypotheses can be developed as fol-
lows:
H6: institutional ownership affects the relation-
ship of free cash flow and earnings manage-
ment
The Effect of Independent Directors on the
Relationship between Leverage and Earnings
Management
Independent board task is to supervise and
advise the board of directors, and ensures that
the company has undertaken the responsibility to
stakeholders. Independent Commissioners aim to
balance in decision making especially in the frame-
work of the protection of minority shareholders
and other parties concerned. Research from
Naftalia (2013) states that companies that have a
composition of board members who come from
outside the company can minimize profit manage-
ment action. Thus, an independent board of com-
missioners can assist in making decisions within
the company so as to protect shareholders from
certain actions taken by management such as profit
management actions caused by leverage. Thus,
seventh hypotheses can be developed as follows:
H7: independent directors of the board affect the
relationship between leverage and earnings
management
The Effect of Independent Director on the
Relationship between Free Cash Flow and
Earnings Management
Independent board includes a duty and re-
sponsibility to ensure that the company has effec-
tive business strategy (monitoring schedule, bud-
get, and the effectiveness of the strategy), comply
with the laws and regulations in force, and ensure
that the principles and practices of good corpo-
rate governance has been complied with and imple-
mented well (Agustia, 2013). So, with the inde-
pendent board is expected to help minimize the
actions of management in managing profit due to
the fund company’s free cash flow that is not
handled properly by the management company for
its own sake. Thus, eight hypotheses could be sum-
marized is:
H8: council independent commissioners effect on
the relationship between free cash flow and
earnings management
The Role of Corporate Governance as a Leverage Moderating and Free Cash Flow on Earnings Management
Reni Yendrawati, Erin Febriana Asy’ari
| 417 |
The Effect of the Audit Committee on the
Relationship between Leverage and Earnings
Management
In accordance with Kep.29/PM/2004, the
audit committee is a committee established by the
board of directors to perform supervisory tasks
management companies (Kristiani, Sulindawati, &
Herawati, 2014). The existence of the audit com-
mittee is very important for the management of
the company. So, with the existence of audit com-
mittee in a company aim to balance in decision
making especially in the framework of protection
against minority shareholders and other parties
related from earnings management action. If a
company threatened liquidation which caused
greater the leverage ratio shows the greater the
company’s dependence on external parties (credi-
tors) and the greater the burden of debt costs (in-
terest costs) to be paid by the company.
By increasing the leverage ratio (where the
debt burden is also getting bigger) then it will af-
fect the profitability obtained by the company, as
most are used to pay interest on the loan, then the
decision that tends to do with the immediate man-
agement is earnings management. By doing earn-
ings management, the company’s performance will
look good in the eyes of shareholders and the
public in spite of its imperiled liquidated. With the
audit committee where audit committee was
formed for the protection of the decision-making
that will impact shareholders, is expected to over-
see and protect shareholders from management
actions related earnings leverage. Thus, ninth hy-
potheses can be developed as follows:
H9: the audit committee has an effect on the re-
lationship between leverage and earnings
management
The Effect of the Audit Committee on the
Relationship between Free Cash Flow and
Earnings Management
The task of the committee dealing with the
quality of the financial statements, because of the
audit committee is expected to assist the commis-
sioners in performing the tasks is overseeing the
financial reporting process by management where
the management often take action malakukan
profit management company where management
is given authority to the financial statements. The
principal gives the authority to the management
(agent). Agents are more aware of information
about the state of the company including the ex-
istence of free cash flow. The transfer of responsi-
bilities and powers of shareholders to the man-
ager, the agency raises issues related to the dif-
ference of interests between the shareholders or
principal by the agent (manager).
According to Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standard No. 2 Paragraph 05 (IAI, 2007),
cash flow is defined as inflows and outflows of
cash or cash equivalents. Cash flow statement clas-
sifies transactions into 3 activities, namely operat-
ing, financing, and investment. Cash flow prob-
lems indicated by the use of free cash flow. The
shareholders want the free cash flow distributed
as dividends, while the manager wants free cash
flow used for investments that will be profitable
for the manager. Free cash flow contained in the
company would affect the company’s performance.
Free cash flow can be interpreted as the existance
of excess funds, which should be distributed to
the shareholders but the decision was influenced
by management policy (Arieska & Gunawan, 2011).
Thus, tenth hypotheses can be developed as fol-
lows:
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H10: the audit committee has an effect on the re-
lationship between free cash flow and earn-
ings management
METHODS
The population of this study are all manu-
facturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange. Samples are chosen based on purposive
sampling method that is the determination of the
sample based on the suitability of certain charac-
teristics and criteria. The criteria used in sampling
are as follows: (1) manufacturing companies listed
on BEI 2010-2014; and (2) companies that have the
required data. The number of samples meeting the
criteria in this study were 175 companies.
Earnings management is proxied by discre-
tionary accruals using the modified Jones model
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1995). The indepen-
dent variable in this study is the use of leverage
ratio that indicates the amount of debt used to
finance the company’s assets. Calculation of lever-
age is calculated as total debt divided by total as-
sets. Free cash flow, this variable is calculated us-
ing the formula Brigham & Houston (2010),
namely:
Free Cash Flow=
NOPAT – Net Investment in Operating Capital
Note:
NOPAT (Net Operating Profit After Tax) =
EBIT (1–tax rate)
Net investment in operating capital =
total operational capital - total operational capital -1
Total operating capital=
net working capital operating + net fixed assets
Net working capital =
expedite assets - current liabilities without interest
Moderating variable in this research that cor-
porate governance mechanism that consists of
managerial ownership, institutional ownership,
independent board, and audit committee. In this
research, the researchers conducted several tests
to process the data already obtained, namely de-
scriptive analysis, classic assumption test consist-
ing of normality test, multicolinearity test, auto-
correlation test, heteroscedicity test. While test-
ing the hypothesis there are F-test, t-test, the co-
efficient of determination, and multiple linear
regression tests. Here is the regression equation
used in this study:
DA= ?0 + ?1 Lev + ?2 FCF + ?3 KM + ?4 KepIns +
?5 DKI + ?6 KA + ?7 Lev*KM + ?8 Lev*
KepIns + ?9 Lev*DKI + ?10Lev*KA+ ?11
FCF*KM+ ?12 FCF*KepIns + ?13 FCF*DKI +
?14 FCF*KA
Note:
Lev = level of corporate debt
?0 = constants
?1-14 = coefficient
DA = earnings management proxy for discre-
tionary accruals (DA)
KepIns = institutional ownership is measured by
percentage share ownership owned by
the institution
KM = managerial ownership is measured by
the percentage of share owned by mana-
gerial
KA = audit committee is measured by the num-
ber of audit committee members present
in the company
DKI = independent board of commissioners is
measured by the percentage of indepen-
dent commissioners compared to the to-
tal existing board of commissioners
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 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DA 175 5.303 18.253 13.45479 1.834179 
Lev 175 0.00025 3.60407 0.5151495 0.43929175 
FCF 175 -9E+007 8378927 -1382454 7328208.228 
KM 175 0.000004 180.3000 3.878133 23.8624562 
KepIns 175 0.0000 693.7000 14.685274 91.8473769 
DKI 175 0.200 0.750 0.36825 0.103367 
KA 175 1 1 1.00 0.000 
Valid N (listwise) 175     
Table 1. Descriptive Analysis
RESULTS
Descriptive Analysis
Based on Table 1 then the average of earn-
ing management (DA) has a positive value, this
means that the companies sampled in the research
actions earnings management by increasing prof-
its, either by raising revenues or reduce the load.
The average leverage (Lev) unfavorable because
it exceeds the standard limit the use of leverage
by (0.5), while the data storage Free Cash Flow
(FCF) is quite low. The average value of Manage-
rial Ownership (KM) away from the fairly stan-
dard deviation thus Managerial Ownership data
storage (KM) is quite high. According Agustia
(2013) from the descriptive statistics it is seen that
the company’s managerial ownership in Indone-
sia is very small with an average of less than 5
percent. So managers who also own shares of the
company tend to take the policy to manage earn-
ings from the point of view of the desire of inves-
tors, for example by increasing the reported profit
so that many investors who are interested to in-
vest and can raise the company’s stock pLee.
The average value of Ownership instuonal
(KepsIns) away from the standard deviation thus
instuonal Ownership data storage (KepsIns) tall.
The average value of an Independent Commissioner
Board (DKI) approaching the standard deviation
thus data storage Independent Commissioner
Board Composition (DKI) is low. The average value
of the Audit Committee (AC) approached the stan-
dard deviation value, thus the data storage AC is
low. It also indicates that the data on the audit com-
mittee variables have the same distribution with a
mean value -rata of the audit committee which has
one of the audit committee.
Classic Assumption Test
This study has passed the classical assump-
tion test. The result of normality with the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test obtained probability
score 0.410 > 0.05. To test multicolinearity the tol-
erance value produced >0.1 and VIF <10. For D-W
values obtained autocorrelation test statistic of
1.920. With n= 175, k= 14, and a significance level
(?) of 5 percent, then the value of dL= 1.621, dU=
1.919, thus: (4-dU)= 4 to 1.919= 2.081 and (4-dL)=
4 to 1.621= 2.390. So we can conclude D-Wstatistic
value of 1.920 is in the reception area of H0. To
test heteroscedasticity using Glejser seen that the
probability value > 0.05. This means that models
are estimated to be free of heteroscedasticity.
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Test
Based on Table 2, we get the following mul-
tiple regression equation:
DA= 5,346 + 3,712Lev + 0,00000255FCF + 0,016KM
+ 0,004KepIns + 1,018DKI + 6,274KA +(-
0,011Lev*KM) + (-0,000000212FCF*KM) +
0,002Lev*KepIns + (-0,00000000935FCF*
KepIns) + (-1,681Lev*DKI)+ (-0,00000163
FCF*DKI) + (-0,700Lev*KA) + 0,000000896
FCF*KA
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The results of multiple regression equation
indicate that the leverage has a positive effect on
earnings management, as shown by the significant
value of 0.000 less than 0.05 (?= 5 percent) and the
regression coefficient of 3.712. Free cash flow posi-
tive effects on earnings management, as shown by
the significant value of 0.000 less than 0.05 (?= 5
percent) and the regression coefficient 0.00000255.
Managerial ownership negatively affects the rela-
tionship between leverage and earnings manage-
ment, this is demonstrated by the significant value
of 0.000 less than 0.05 (?= 5 percent) and the re-
gression coefficient -0.011.
Managerial ownership negative effect on the
relationship between free cash flow and earnings
management, this is indicated by a significance
value of 0.000 smaller than 0.05 (?= 5 percent) and
regression coefficient of -0.000000212. Institutional
ownership does not affect the relationship lever-
age and earnings management, this is indicated
with a significance value of 0.653 is greater than
0.05 (?= 5 percent) and koefisien regression of
0.002. Institutional ownership affects negatively on
the relationship of free cash flow and earnings man-
agement, as shown by the significant value of 0.015
is less than 0.05 (? = 5 percent) and the regression
coefficient of -0.00000000935.
Independent board negatively affect lever-
age and earnings management relations, as shown
by the significant value of 0.048 is less than 0.05
(?= 5 percent) and the regression coefficient of -
1.681. Independent board does not affect the rela-
tionship of free cash flow and earnings manage-
ment, this is indicated with a significance of 0.371
use values greater than 0.05 (?= 5 percent) and
the regression coefficient -0.00000163.
The audit committee negatively affect lever-
age and earnings management relations, as shown
by the significant value of 0.034 is less than 0.05
(?= 5 percent) and the regression coefficient of -
0.700. The audit committee does not affect the re-
lationship of free cash flow and earnings manage-
ment, as shown by the significant value of 0.141 is
greater than 0.05 (?= 5 percent) and the regres-
sion coefficient of 0.000000896.
Variabel Coefficien Regression Standard Error Sig. 
Constants 5.346 2.016 0.009 
Lev 3.712 0.298 0.000 
FCF 0.00000255 0.000 0.000 
KM 0.016 0.002 0.000 
KepIns 0.004 0.011 0.710 
DKI 1.018 0.945 0.283 
KA 6.274 2.052 0.003 
Lev*KM -0.011 0.001 0.000 
FCF*KM -0.000000212 0.000 0.000 
Lev*KepIns 0.002 0.005 0.653 
FCF*KepIns -0.00000000935 0.000 0.015 
Lev*DKI -1.681 0.901 0.048 
FCF*DKI -0.00000163 0.000 0.371 
Lev*KA -0.700 0.328 0.034 
FCF*KA 0.000000896 0.000 0.141 
F-statistics : 203.561. Sig= 0.000. 
DW-statistics :1.920 
N= 175 
Table 2. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Test
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F Test
F test results indicate calculated F value of
34.031. Obtained by the Sig= 0.000. Value shows
the error rate to be borne by the researcher if the
model is said to be good. Since the significant value
of F is 0.000 it can be concluded that the error rate
is very small. Little significant value F indicates
the existing model is a good model and fit for use.
DISCUSSION
The results of multiple linear regression
showed that the leverage effect positive signifi-
cantly to earnings management. It means that in-
creasing leverage, then also increase the earnings
management. Because debt (leverage) is an agree-
ment between the company as a debtor by credi-
tors. In agreement debt, there is the interest of
the company to be assessed positively by the lend-
ers in terms of ability to pay the debts of her. There
is a possibility that the contract agreements of debt
triggered management to increase profits with the
aim of showing the positive performance on the
lender because the performance is considered
stable so that companies obtain injections funds.
The usual management measures are income
smoothing to obtain a stable impression by the
creditors (Zakaria, Sanusi, & Mohamed, 2015). The
results support the research that has been done
by Zamri, Rahman, & Isa (2013) and conducted by
Lee (2013) who found results that the leverage
effect on the actions of earnings management.
Free cash flow impact positively signifi-
cantly to earnings management. This means that
increasing free cash flow, then the earnings man-
agement will also be increasing. Because with their
free cash flow will encourage managers to invest.
As a result, companies with high free cash flow is
accompanied by low growth opportunities will
tend to continue to invest in projects with nega-
tive NPV, which may be beneficial for managers,
either in cash or in exchange for something else, it
will degrade the performance of the company.
Furthermore, in an attempt to cover up the
company’s performance, the manager will act earn-
ings management to increase profits (Fanani, 2014).
Managerial ownership significant negative
effect on the relationship between leverage and
earnings management. This means that the mana-
gerial ownership capable to reduce leverage and
these earnings. This management explained that
if the managerial ownership over securities com-
panies can equate the interests of management
with external parties. Increasing ownership by
management, will lead the management of pru-
dence in the use of debt and avoid opportunistic
behavior because they bear the consequences of
his actions. So that managerial ownership may re-
duce the willingness of management to follow the
earnings management.
Managerial ownership significant negative
effect on the relationship between free cash flow
to earnings management. This means that mana-
gerial ownership is able to reduce the free cash
flow relationship with earnings management. Due
to a managerial ownership over securities compa-
nies can equate interest with an external manage-
ment company, where such interest is the desire
to get the result of the division of dividends re-
ceived from free cash flow. This means that the
presence of managerial ownership, the relation-
ship between free cash flow to earnings manage-
ment can be reduced. Because if the high manage-
rial ownership then stock returns will also be high,
so that the management does not want to commit
acts of earnings management. Because manage-
ment does not only serve as the manager of the
company, but also as shareholders who desire high
stock returns. The results of this study support
the research Naftalia (2013) concluded that man-
agement ownership in the shares of companies
seen to align the potential divergence of interests
between shareholders with management. So that
the problems the agency arising from their free
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cash flow of a company is assumed to be lost if a
manager to act at once as an owner.
Institutional ownership does not affect the
relationship between leverage and earnings man-
agement. This means that institutional ownership
has no effect in reducing leverage and profit. It
means that if there institutionally ownership, in-
stitutional ownership can not moderate the rela-
tionship between leverage and earnings manage-
ment. Due according Kusumaningtyas (2012) the
purpose of institutional ownership as a temporary
owner who is more focused on current earnings,
while the focus of leverage is long term. So it can
be concluded that institutional ownership is not
focused on management decisions related to the
high degree of leverage can lead to earnings man-
agement.
Institutional ownership significant negative
effect on the relationship between free cash flow
with earnings management. This means that the
ownership of institutional able to reduce free cash
flow relationship with profit. This is because man-
agers tend to pursue personal interests, using free
cash flow to pay the salaries, allowances and bo-
nus on their own and use the free cash flow avail-
able for investment alternatives without selective
in profitable projects, which would benefit projects
that do not decrease the value of the company so
that the manager will tend to follow the earnings
management to cover up the lack of their perfor-
mance. With the improvement of the monitoring
mechanism by the managers of institutional inves-
tors will be more selective in their choice of in-
vestment alternatives and not just acting to pur-
sue personal gain but to enhance corporate value
and shareholder wealth. It can be concluded that
the existence of institutional ownership in the com-
pany can prevent earnings management due to the
use of free cash flow is not effective.
Independent Board of Commissioner signifi-
cant negative effect on the relationship between
leverage and earnings management. This means
that independent board is able to reduce leverage
and profit. These management this means that the
more the number of independent board then in-
creased surveillance measures in order to reduce
earnings management action. Due to the presence
of independent board oversight function, where
its function is to monitor outcomes keuanganan
statements, the management can not perform op-
portunistic in the use of leverage can lead to acts
of management earnings.
Independent Board of Commissioner has no
effect on the relationship between free cash flow
to earnings management. This means that the in-
dependent board was not able to reduce the free
cash flow relationship with earnings management.
This means in terms of the presence or absence of
independent board can not afford meminimilasir
profit management action caused by free cash flow.
Due to one of the functions of the independent
board is as protective rights of minority sharehold-
ers, thus demanding the management to pay divi-
dends on free cash flow which causes management
actions earnings management by lowering the
profit so that the profits be little to be shared and
this includes management actions profit.
Audit committee has significantly negative
effect on the relationship between leverage and
earnings management. This means the audit com-
mittee able to reduce leverage and earnings man-
agement. That is because the committee that serves
as a supervisor audit management in preparing the
financial statements, the audit committee ensures
the financial statements have been prepared based
on PSAK. High leverage is a result of inefficiency
in the management prepared a report on the fi-
nancial causes the company will go bankrupt be-
cause the company can not pay debt Long-term
assets owned. So that management can not per-
form earnings management practices on leverage
as overseen by the audit committee.
Audit Committee of the audit does not af-
fect the relationship between free cash flow to
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earnings management. This means audit commit-
tee is not able to reduce the free cash flow rela-
tionship with the earnings management. This means
that if there is an audit committee, audit commit-
tee can not moderate the relationship between free
cash flow to earnings management. Due to the
existence of an audit committee that serves as a
supervisor of the financial statements, free cash
flow is used by management in making invest-
ments rated as good by the audit committee for
the sustainability of the company. So that will hap-
pen in lowering their profit earnings management
to distribute free cash flow as dividends to share-
holders and management can make use of free cash
flow in investment activity.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
This study aimed to analyze the effect of le-
verage, free cash flow to earnings management as
well as analyze the impact of corporate governance
on the relationship of leverage and free cash flow
to earnings management.
Result of study showed that leverage and
free cash flow positive significant effect on earn-
ings management action. If leverage and free cash
flow increases, so the action of earnings manage-
ment increases. Managerial ownership moderat-
ing leverage relationships and free cash flow to
earnings management proved significant. With
increasing managerial ownership, it will weaken
the relationship of leverage and free cash flow to
earnings management.
Institutional ownership moderating leverage
and earnings management relations proved to be
significant. Increase or decrease in institutional
ownership does not affect leverage relationships
with earnings management. Institutional owner-
ship that moderate the relationship of free cash
flow and earnings management proved significant.
The increasing institutional ownership will further
weaken the relationship of free cash flow to earn-
ings management. Independent board that mod-
erate the relationship leverage and free cash flow
with management earnings proved significant.
With increasing commissioners of independent will
weak relationships leverage and free cash flow to
earnings management. The audit committee mod-
erating leverage and earnings management rela-
tions proved significant. With the increase of the
audit committee will weaken the relationship le-
verage with earnings management. The audit com-
mittee which moderates the relationship of free
cash flow and earnings management proved to be
insignificant. Increases or decrease number of au-
dit committee is not going to affect the relation-
ship of free cash flow to earnings management.
Suggestions
This study has some limitations that may
affect the results of research that want to achieved,
that this study only took samples from the manu-
facturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Ex-
change by purposive sampling and based on the
theory that agency theory, where there are theo-
ries another explains the motivation of managers
in managing earnings.
As for suggestions that could be given re-
lated to this research for further research is ex-
pected to use a broader sampling as companies
overall are listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange
or other exchanges so that research results can be
generalized and is expected to add to the theory
other basis to be know the motivation of manag-
ers in making profit management, where earnings
management practices can be explained not only
of agency theory, but there is another theory that
can explain earnings management practices under-
taken by corporate managers. For companies
should better understand the role of the practice
of corporate governance on earnings management
due to the influence of the level of debt (leverage)
and free cash flow activities.
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